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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 









Every year, the world loses millions of hectares of forests,1 and forestry accounts for 
around 12-18 percent of global carbon emissions.2 States have long strived to adopt 
an international instrument on forests.3 The numerous regional and multilateral 
initiatives established to address this objective have achieved little in the way of 
concrete results.4 And yet, as substitution for some forest ecosystem services5 may be 
                                                
1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Global Forest Resources Assessment, at 
3 (2010). 
2 According to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), forestry accounts for around 17 percent of global carbon emissions. 
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2007). According to more recent 
estimates, this number may be closer to 15 percent, taking into account emissions 
from peat lands (excluded from the IPCC estimate) as well as increased fossil fuel 
emissions and updated deforestation data, see G.R. van der Werf et al., CO2 
Emissions from Forest Loss 2 Nature Geoscience 737 (2009). 
3 The most salient outcome of these processes was the adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly of the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable 
Forest Management of All Types of Forests, UN Doc. A/RES/62/98 
UNGA/Res/62/98 (31 January 2008). For a review, see K. Kunzmann, The 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Management of All Types of 
Forests: Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest Management? 9 
German L.J. 981 (2008). 
4 For an overview, see R.D. Lipschutz, Why Is There No International Forestry Law? 
An Examination of International Forestry Regulation, both Public and Private 
19 U.C.L.A. J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 153 (2001); D. Humphreys, The Elusive 
Quest for a Global Forests Convention 14 R.E.C.I.E.L. 1 (2005); R.S. 
Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics 5 
Global Envt’l Politics 1 (2005); and, more recently, J. Rayner, A. Buck, and P. 
Katila, Embracing Complexity: Meeting the Challenges of International Forest 
Governance: A Global Assessment Report, Prepared by the Global Forest 
Expert Panel on the International Forest Regime (IUFRO World Series, 2010). 
5 Ecosystem services may be defined as ‘the conditions and processors through which 
natural ecosystems, and species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human 
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impossible, forests arguably need to be managed in a way that is consistent with 
international obligations on issues regarded as a common concern of all states, such as 
biodiversity protection and climate change mitigation.6  
Initiatives to tackle forest loss have found renewed impetus in the framework 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).7 The 
objective of the UNFCCC is ‘to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.’8 Such a level ‘should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’9  
Negotiations under the UNFCCC have drawn unprecedented attention to the 
role of forests in mitigating climate change. Since 2007, ‘reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries’ (REDD) has become central to the negotiations on 
long-term co-operative action under the convention, as outlined in the Bali Action 
Plan.10 Action to support REDD may ‘promote co-benefits and complement the aims 
                                                                                                                                      
life.’ G. Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital through Ecosystem Service 
Districts 20 Stanford Envt’l L. J. 333 at 336 (2001). For a discussion, see J. 
Boyd and S. Banzhaf, What Are Ecosystem Services? The Need for 
Standardized Environmental Accounting Units, 
<http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-06-02.pdf>  
6 Compare United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 
(1992) [UNFCCC], preamble, para. 1: ‘Acknowledging that change in the 
Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind.’ 
As of 11 March 2011, 195 parties (including the European Union) have 
ratified the convention. See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification, 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/item
s/2631.php>. Compare also Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 
818 (1992) [CBD], preamble, para. 3: ‘Affirming that the conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind.’ As of 11 March 
2011, 193 parties (including the European Union) have ratified the 
convention. See CBD, status of ratification, 
<http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml>. 
7 UNFCCC, supra note 6. 
8 Ibid., Article 2.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Compare Bali Action Plan, UNFCCC, 13th Session, Bali, Indonesia, 3-15 
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and objectives of other relevant international conventions and agreements.’11 As the 
negotiations have progressed, numerous authors have underscored the opportunities to 
combine biodiversity conservation with climate change mitigation.12 The contours of 
this process came into focus at the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP), with the 
adoption of the so-called Cancun Agreements, which include a chapter on REDD as 
well as a list of ‘safeguards.’13 The safeguards are chiefly meant to address REDD’s 
environmental and social impact.14 The present article does not provide a 
                                                                                                                                      
December 2007, Decision 1/CP.13, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/6/Add.1 (2007) at 
1(b)(iii). Whereas negotiations initially focused on reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries only, the concept 
was subsequently expanded to include ‘the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries.’ This ensemble of activities is commonly referred to with the 
acronym ‘REDD+’.  For the sake of expediency, the present article will only 
use the acronym REDD to encompass also this enlarged scope.  
11 Decision 2/CP.13 on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/6/Add.1 
(2007), preamble, para. 9.  
12 See, among others, T. Pistorius et al., Greening REDD+: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Forest Biodiversity Conservation (2010); C.A. Harvey, B. 
Dickson, and C. Kormos, Opportunities for Achieving Biodiversity 
Conservation through REDD 3 Conservation Letters 53 (2010); J. Busch et 
al., Biodiversity Co-Benefits of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation under 
Alternative Reference Levels and Levels of Finance 4 Conservation Letters 2 
(2011) 110-15; B. Dickson and M. Osti, What Are the Ecosystem-Derived 
Benefits of REDD+ and Why Do They Matter? Multiple Benefits Series 1, 
Prepared on behalf of the UN-REDD Programme (2010); L. Miles, E. 
Dunning, and N. Doswald, Safeguarding and Enhancing the Ecosystem 
Derived Benefits of REDD+, Multiple Benefits Series 2, Prepared on behalf of 
the UN-REDD Programme (2010). 
13 Decision 1/CP.16 on Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/7/Add.1 (2010) at IIIc and Appendix I, respectively. 
14 In this regard, the agreements assert that when undertaking REDD activities ‘the 
following safeguards should be promoted and supported: (a) That actions 
complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest 
programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements; (b) 
Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into 
account national legislation and sovereignty; (c) Respect for the knowledge 
and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking 
into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and 
laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; (d) The full 
and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous 
peoples and local communities …; (e) That actions are consistent with the 
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comprehensive overview of all safeguards, but it focuses only on those that are 
relevant to the conservation of biodiversity.  
Biodiversity safeguards present an opportunity for investigating how REDD 
may enhance concerted action to simultaneously achieve the objectives of the 
UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in the forest sector.15 
The legal debate on REDD was initiated by seminal works by Charlotte Streck.16 
Numerous authors have since sought to shed light on technical questions associated 
with economic incentives for protecting forests in developing countries17 as well as 
with broader governance challenges facing REDD.18 Earlier works have analyzed 
conflicts between obligations under the CBD and afforestation and reforestation 
projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).19 Fewer authors have 
                                                                                                                                      
conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, ensuring that the 
actions…are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead 
used to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their 
ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits; 
(f) Actions to address the risks of reversals; (g) Actions to reduce 
displacement of emissions.’ Ibid., Appendix 1 at 2. 
15 CBD, supra note 6. 
16 See C. Streck and S.M. Scholz, The Role of Forests in Climate Change 82 Int’l 
Affairs 5 at 861-79 (2006); C. Streck, ed., Carbon and Climate Law Review, 
Special Issue: Climate Policy, Carbon Markets and Forestry, volume 3 (2008); 
C. Streck et al., eds., Climate Change and Forests: Emerging Policy and 
Market Opportunities (2008). 
17 See, among others, R. O’Sullivan and R. Saines, International Market Solutions to 
Protect Tropical Rainforests, in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck, eds., 
Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond, 583 
(2009); Baker and McKenzie, Background Analysis of REDD: Regulatory 
Frameworks (2009); D. Zarin et al., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment (2009). 
18 Compare I. Fry, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Developing a New Legal Regime 17 R.E.C.I.E.L. 
166 (2008); J. Costenbader, ed., Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and 
Implementation at the National Level, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law 
Paper No. 77 (2009); L. Cotula and J. Mayers, Tenure in REDD: Start-Point or 
Afterthought? Natural Resource Issues No. 15, International Institute for 
Environment and Development. (2009); L. Peskett et al., Making REDD Work 
for the Poor (2008); and F. Lesniewska, REDD: The Copenhagen Effect 6 
Law, Environment and Development Journal 102 (2010). 
19 C.M. Pontecorvo, Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes: The 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and Forest Protection 59 Heidelberg J. 
Int’l. L. 709 (1999); F. Jacquemont and A. Caparrós, The Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Climate Change Convention Ten Years after Rio: 
Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes? 11 R.E.C.I.E.L. 169 (2002); I. 
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attempted to position REDD within the broader theoretical context of international 
environmental law.20 
The present article builds upon this literature to investigate REDD’s potential 
to combine biodiversity conservation with climate change mitigation. In order to 
ascertain this potential, the article reviews selected aspects of the debate on REDD 
safeguards, analyzing them through the lens of enhanced cooperation to achieve the 
objectives of the UNFCCC and the CBD. After an introduction on the notion of 
REDD and its possible biodiversity benefits and risks, the article identifies challenges 
to effectively combine climate change mitigation with biodiversity conservation in the 
forest sector. The guidance provided so far by the CBD and the UNFCCC COPs is 
assessed in light of developments at the meetings held in 2010. The conclusions 
underscore how the debate on REDD safeguards may facilitate the harmonization of 
overlapping obligations under the two conventions.  
 
1. Forests, Climate Change, and Biodiversity 
 
Forests host the world’s most biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems, providing numerous 
services, such as climate and water quality regulation and soil formation.21 Millions of 
                                                                                                                                      
Sagemüller, Forest Sinks under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for 
Biodiversity? 31 Col. J. Envt’l L. 189 (2006); J. Schwartz, ‘Whose Woods 
These Are I Think I Know’: How Kyoto May Change Who Controls 
Biodiversity 14 N.Y.U. Envt’l L. J. (2006); and H. van Asselt, F. Sindico, and 
M.A. Mehling, Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of 
International Law 30 Law & Policy 423 (2008). 
20 See H. van Asselt, Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental 
Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes N.Y. 
U. J. Int'l L. and Pol. [forthcoming]; W. Boyd, Ways of Seeing in 
Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate 
Governance 37 Ecol. L. Q. (2010); A. Long, Global Climate Governance to 
Enhance Biodiversity and Well-Being: Integrating Non-State Networks and 
Public International Law in Tropical Forests 41 Envt’l L. 1 (2011). 
21 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustainable Forest 
Management, Biodiversity and Livelihoods: A Good Practice Guide, at 5 
(2009): ‘Forest biodiversity underpins a wide range of goods and services for 
human well-being. Ecologically intact forests store and purify drinking water, 
they can mitigate natural disasters such as droughts and floods, they help store 
carbon and regulate the climate, they provide food and produce rainfall, and 
they provide a vast array of goods for medicinal, cultural and spiritual 
purposes. The health of forests and the provision of these and further forest 
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people depend on forests for their livelihoods, fuel, food, and income.22 Forests also 
play a key role in the global carbon cycle. While standing forests store carbon, acting 
as carbon ‘sinks,’ deforestation sends carbon back into the atmosphere, thus rendering 
forests major carbon ‘sources.’ These emissions are largely associated with 
deforestation, and to the related problem of forest degradation.23 
Deforestation and forest degradation are caused by a complex combination of 
factors, including various market drivers and policy and governance failures that 
make it more attractive to fell trees than to keep them standing. The extraction of 
forest resources has increasingly shifted from developed countries, with relatively 
advanced environmental protection standards, to developing countries, with 
permissive or poorly enforced forestry policies.24 Deforestation and forest degradation 
are especially conspicuous in the tropics,25 where land clearing by commercial 
operators has become predominant over subsistence activities.26 As a result, several 
tropical countries are rapidly depleting their forests and may lose them altogether by 
the end of the century.27 Importing forest products from these regions may therefore 
be viewed as of way of exporting ecological impacts.28  
Forest loss raises concerns not only for its impact on carbon emissions, but 
also on ecosystems. The global trade of timber and agricultural products has put 
increasing pressure on biodiverse and carbon-rich ‘primary forests.’29 Remaining 
                                                                                                                                      
ecosystem services depend on the diversity between species, the genetic 
diversity within species, and the diversity of forest types.’ 
22 For a recent survey, see A. Angelsen et al., eds., Measuring Livelihoods and 
Environmental Dependence: Methods for Research and Fieldwork (2011). 
23 For the definitions of these terms, see infra second section of this article.  
24 P. Meyfroidt, T.K. Rudel and E.F. Lambin, ‘Forest transitions, trade, and the global 
displacement of land use’ 107 PNAS 20917, (2010), at 1. 
25 FAO, supra note 1 at 4. 
26 For an overview, see H. Geist and E. Lambin, What Drives Tropical Deforestation? 
A Meta-Analysis of Proximate and Underlying Causes of Deforestation Based 
on Subnational Case Study Evidence (LUCC Report Series, 2001). 
27 For example, B.S. Soares-Filho et al. estimate that, under business as usual, 
deforestation could destroy as much as 40 percent of the Amazon forest by 
2050. Compare B.S. Soares-Filho et al., Modelling Conservation in the 
Amazon Basin 440 Nature 520 (2006). 
28 A.L. Mayer et al., Ecology: Importing Timber, Exporting Ecological Impact 308 
Science 359 at 359 (2005). 
29 Primary forests are defined as ‘naturally regenerated forest of native species, where 
there are no clearly visible indications of human activities and the ecological 
processes are not significantly disturbed.’ Currently, only one-third of the 
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tropical forests provide precious ecosystem services, whose substitution may be 
impossible, especially with regard to their contribution to climate stability, watershed 
and soil protection, and biodiversity conservation. For example, it has been estimated 
that if as little as 30 percent of the Amazon rainforest is cleared, it may no longer 
generate enough rainfall to sustain itself and would convert into a savannah system.30 
These matters are not just of concern for countries that presently harbour forests. 
Increased awareness of dangers associated with forest loss has lead to a long strife to 
promote sustainable forest management, both at the international and at the domestic 
level.31 However, differences among regions remain marked, and it has proven 
difficult to devise and enforce a comprehensive global instrument for protecting 
forest. 
So far, states have failed to effectively address the global drivers of 
deforestation and, more specifically, the displacement of environmental pressure 
associated with the international trade of timber and agricultural products.32 Forests 
are chiefly regarded as natural resources in international law, which recognizes that 
states have the sovereign right to exploit their forest resources according to their own 
environmental policies, coupled with the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.33 The protection of forests’ 
                                                                                                                                      
world’s remaining forest is categorized as primary forests, and this ratio is 
steadily decreasing. FAO, supra note 1 at 211 and 192, respectively. The size 
of the area of primary forest is an important indicator of the state of forest 
ecosystems. Ibid. at 52.  
30 Compare D.C. Nepstad et al., Interactions among Amazon Land Use, Forests and 
Climate: Prospects for a Near-Term Forest Tipping Point 363 Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society 1737 at 1740 (2008); and, more recently, 
S.L. Lewis et al., The 2010 Amazon Drought 331 Science 554 (2011). 
31 See Kunzmann, supra note 3.  
32 For a comprehensive review, see Rayner, Buck, and Katila, supra note 4.  
33 Compare Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of 
All Types of Forests (Forest Principles), 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992) at 1(a): ‘States 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies and have the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.’ This principle recalls Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 
 
Forthcoming, 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011) 
 8 
ecosystem services arguably requires that sovereignty be exercised in a way that is 
consistent with international obligations on issues regarded as a common concern of 
all states, such as biodiversity protection and climate change.34 In this context, the 
debate on REDD provides new momentum to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the 
objectives of the CBD and the UNFCCC in the forest sector. 
 
2. What Is REDD? 
 
Forests are both carbon sinks and sources under the UNFCCC,35 which specifically 
mentions that policies and measures to deal with climate change should ‘be 
comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases 
and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors.’36 This mandate has to date only 
been partially fulfilled in connection with forests, chiefly for reasons related to the 
approach undertaken with the Kyoto Protocol to the convention.37  
                                                                                                                                      
(1972); and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992). Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration may be regarded as a statement of customary 
international law, which appears also in Article 3 of the CBD and in the 
preamble of the UNFCCC. For an assessment on the status of the principle in 
international law, compare P.M. Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law 
of the Environment 12 Michigan J. Int’l L. 420 at 422 (1990-1). 
34 See note 6 in this article and corresponding text. 
35 UNFCCC, supra note 6, Article 4.1 (c, d). The UNFCCC defines ‘sources’ as any 
process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor 
of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere, while ‘sinks’ are any process, 
activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere (Article 1.8-9). 
36 Ibid., Article 3.3. Article 4.1 further adds ‘[a]ll Parties … shall … (c) promote and 
cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of 
technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol in all relevant sectors, including ... forestry; (d) promote sustainable 
management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and 
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including ... forests.’ Forests and 
forestry therefore feature unequivocally among the measures to mitigate the 
adverse effects of climate change. 
37 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
37 I.L.M. 32 (1998). As of 12 March 2011, the Kyoto Protocol had been 
ratified by 193 countries (including the European Union), with the United 
States not having ratified. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification, 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php>. 
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Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, most developed country parties to the 
convention agreed to binding quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives 
in selected sectors of their economies for the period between 2008 and 2012.38 These 
reduction commitments centre on emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels (or 
‘brown carbon’), which is the largest source of anthropogenic emissions in developed 
countries. Greenhouse gas removals and emissions from forests can account towards 
their emission inventories in two ways: (1) as part of a country’s national balance of 
emissions and removals from land use, land-use change, and forestry and (2) as 
credits from project activities undertaken in developing country parties under the 
CDM. The CDM enables the creation of credits for emission reduction projects in 
developing countries, which may be purchased to meet developed country parties’ 
commitments.39 At present, the only forestry activities eligible for CDM credits are 
reforestation and afforestation, but not avoided deforestation. This exclusion was 
motivated by methodological concerns that were initially perceived as insurmountable 
obstacles to incentivizing avoided deforestation as well as by concerns of diverting 
attention away from the reduction of emissions associated with the combustion of 
fossil fuels.40  
The debate on avoided deforestation as an option to take action for climate 
change mitigation gained new momentum in 2005. The initial proposal was to ‘draw 
developing countries towards emission reductions’ by addressing emissions from 
deforestation, either by including them in the Kyoto Protocol or through an optional 
protocol to the UNFCCC.41 The ensuing debate resulted in the establishment of a 
program of work on methodological issues related to a range of policy approaches and 
positive incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
                                                
38 Ibid., Annex A and B. 
39 Ibid., Article 12. 
40 For an overview, see D. Humphreys, The Politics of ‘Avoided Deforestation’: 
Historical Context and Contemporary Issues 10 Int’l Forestry Rev. 433 
(2008); P. Graichen, Can Forestry Gain from Emissions Trading? Rules 
Governing Sinks Projects Under the UNFCCC and the EU Emissions Trading 
System 14 R.E.C.I.E.L. 11 (2005). 
41 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to 
Stimulate Action: Submission from Parties, Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC, 11th Sess., Montreal, Canada, UN Doc FCCC/CP/Misc.1 (2005) at 
8. 
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in developing countries.42 Negotiations have since progressed rapidly and several 
proposals for REDD have been advanced, with significant differences in scope, 
reference levels for carbon crediting, and other design features.43  
The newly found enthusiasm for addressing emissions from avoided 
deforestation under the umbrella of the UNFCCC might be explained by a number of 
factors, including scientific progress on how to address concerns previously raised.44 
In addition, there is increased awareness that avoiding deforestation is affected by 
time constraints and that the window of opportunity is closing rapidly. As 
deforestation is projected to decrease when the remaining forests become less 
accessible, the immediate and long-term benefits of avoided deforestation are going to 
be higher the sooner it starts.45  
Influential reports have also indicated that avoided deforestation may be a 
relatively inexpensive climate change mitigation option, comparing favourably with 
the costs of lowering emissions in other sectors, because of the potential of achieving 
significant cost-effective emission reductions in the near term.46 Although these 
                                                
42 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), Report on a 
Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/10 (2006); SBSTA, Report on the Second 
Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/3 (2007); SBSTA, Report on the 
Workshop on Methodological Issues Relating to Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, UN Doc 
FCCC/SBSTA/11 (2008). 
43 For a review, see C. Parker et al., The Little REDD+ Book: A Guide to 
Governmental and Non-Governmental Proposals for Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation (2009). 
44 For an overview, see Boyd, supra note 20 at 878-98. 
45 See B. Fisher et al., Issues Related to Mitigation in the Long Term Context, in B. 
Metz et al., eds., Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, 171 at 188 (2007).  
46 According to the IPCC, ‘a sustainable forest management strategy aimed at 
maintaining or increasing forest carbon stocks, while producing an annual 
sustained yield of timber, fibre or energy from the forest, will generate the 
largest sustained mitigation benefit.’ G.J. Nabuurs et al., Forestry in Climate 
Change 2007: Mitigation, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited 
by B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, and L.A. Meyer, at 73 
(2007).  at 543. Compare also N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: 
The Stern Review, at 13 (2007); and, more generally, J. Eliasch, Climate 
Change: Financing Global Forests, Eliasch Review (2008). 
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assumptions have been questioned by subsequent studies, REDD has since 2007 
become central to negotiations on long-term co-operative action under the 
UNFCCC.47  
 Whereas negotiations initially focused only on reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (hence, the acronym 
REDD), the concept was subsequently expanded to include ‘the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries’ (commonly referred to with the acronym REDD+).48 This 
widening of scope was the result of the realization that a narrower focus may create 
perverse incentives for carbon leakage and biodiversity loss.49 For example, countries 
with high forest cover and low deforestation rates may be prompted to increase 
deforestation in order to benefit from REDD payments. So while deforestation and 
forest degradation have remained immediate priorities, REDD now encompasses also 
the conservation of forest carbon stocks, the sustainable management of forests and 
the enhancement of carbon stocks in developing country parties.50  
Within this enlarged scope, REDD may engender the first international system 
of payments for ecosystem services provided by forests.51 The underpinning for this 
approach derives from the idea that forests’ ecosystem services are public goods and 
that people who ensure these services should be incentivized to continue doing so.52 
The objective is to preserve forests during the risky development phase when 
                                                
47 For an overview, see H. Gregersen et al., Does the Opportunity Cost Approach 
Reflect the Real Cost of REDD+? (2010); N. Dyer and S. Counsell, 
McREDD: How McKinsey ‘Cost-Curves’ Are Distorting REDD (2010); A. 
Angelsen, What Does REDD+ Really Cost? (2011). 
48 See Decision 1/CP.13, supra note 10 at 1(b)(iii); and Decision 2/CP.13, supra note 
11 at 11. 
49 For an analysis, see K. Lawlor et al., Expanding the Scope of International 
Terrestrial Carbon Options: Implications of REDD+ and Beyond (2010). 
50 See Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70. 
51 Payments for ecosystem services can be defined as transactions where a well-
defined ecosystem service or land use likely to secure that service is ‘bought’ 
by at least one buyer from at least one provider. See The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), National and International Policy 
Makers, Part 3, Chapter 5: Rewarding Benefits through Payments and 
Markets, at 6 (2009). Compare also E. Gómez-Baggethun et al., The History of 
Ecosystem Services in Economic Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to 
Markets and Payment Schemes 69 Ecological Economics 1209 at 1214 (2010). 
52 S. Olmstead and N. Keohane, Markets and the Environment, at 70 (2007). 
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countries are most likely to deplete them.53 REDD could streamline the protection of 
forests’ ecosystems services, capturing them through priced rewards, and payments 
may also extend to premiums for biodiversity conservation.54 These payments would 
lead to the internalization of ‘externalities’55 and ‘bridge the forest transition’ 
currently affecting developing countries.56 By establishing an international system of 
payments to incentivize the continued provision of forests’ ecosystem services, 
REDD may enable developing countries to merge forest conservation with climate 
change mitigation, thus providing a novel solution to the vexed problem of forest loss. 
In this regard, REDD has been described as ‘potentially the most far-reaching and 
powerful policy instrument for influencing tropical forest carbon stocks and, hence, 
tropical forest conservation.’57  
 The Cancun Agreements encouraged developing country parties to contribute 
to climate change mitigation through REDD activities, and they have established a 
framework to flesh out and negotiate the details. The envisioned process will take 
place in phases, starting with the development of national strategies, followed by an 
implementation phase, which will include specific action for measuring, reporting, 
and verifying the achieved results.58 In particular, for the first phase the agreements 
request developing country parties intending to undertake REDD activities to develop 
a national strategy or action plan; a national forest reference emission level and/or 
forest reference level; and a robust and transparent national forest monitoring 
                                                
53 M. Dutschke and A. Angelsen, How Do We Ensure Permanence and Assign 
Liability?’ in A. Angelsen, ed., Moving Ahead with REDD, at 78 (2008). 
54 See the discussion later in the second section of this article.  
55 TEEB, Climate Issues Update, at 10 (2009).  
56 The theory of forest transition is deployed to explain the fact that initially a country 
has a high and relatively stable portion of land under forest cover. When 
deforestation begins, it normally accelerates and forest cover reduces rapidly. 
At some point, however, deforestation slows and forest cover stabilizes and 
begins to recover. This process has been completed in most developed 
countries, whereas it is still underway in numerous developing countries. As 
explained by A. Angelsen, ‘forest transition is not a law of nature, and 
transitions are influenced by national contexts, global economic forces and 
government policies.’ With appropriate policies, countries may be able to 
‘bridge the forest transition,’ which is the main aim of REDD. Compare A. 
Angelsen, Introduction, in A. Angelsen, ed., Realising REDD+, 3 at 4 (2009). 
57 C.M. Stickler et al., The Potential Ecological Costs and Co-Benefits of REDD: A 
Critical Review and Case Study from the Amazon Region 15 Global Change 
Biology 2803 at 2804 (2009). 
58 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 73. 
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system.59  
 As mentioned in the Bali Action Plan, measures to curb unsustainable forest 
uses may also ‘promote co-benefits and complement the aims and objectives of other 
relevant international conventions and agreements.’60 The terms co-benefits (or 
multiple benefits) has increasingly appeared in negotiations to indicate REDD’s 
potential for creating positive collateral effects.61 These include both ecosystem-
derived benefits as well as other social benefits, as specifically mentioned in the 
Cancun Agreements.62 ‘Ecosystem-derived benefits’ may be defined as those that are 
direct side-effects of maintaining, increasing, and enhancing forest carbon stocks 
through REDD—that is, biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services other than 
carbon.63  
The conservation of biodiversity, however, does not necessarily correspond 
with carbon sequestration. In fact, a focus on maximizing forest carbon stocks may 
have negative impacts on the provision of other ecosystem services.64 For example, 
plantations of invasive species could provide rapid carbon sequestration at the 
expense of other natural ecosystems with a negative impact on biodiversity.65 So, 
while REDD may bring about positive gains for forest and biodiversity conservation, 
the extent of these gains will depend on its design and implementation, as the next 
section of this article explains.  
 
 
                                                
59 Ibid. at 71. 
60 Decision 2/CP.13, supra note 11. 
61 For an overview, see UN-REDD, Multiple Benefits-Issues and Options for REDD 
(2009). 
62 See Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13, Appendix I at 1. 
63 Ibid., at 1(d), where the decision asserts that REDD activities should ‘be consistent 
with the objective of environmental integrity and take into account the 
multiple functions of forests and other ecosystems.’ See also Miles, Dunning, 
and Doswald, supra note 12 at 2. 
64 For an overview, see CBD Secretariat, Connecting Biodiversity and Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical 
Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change (CBD Technical Series, 
2009). 
65 E. Nelson et al., Efficiency of Incentives to Jointly Increase Carbon Sequestration 
and Species Conservation on a Landscape 105 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 9471 (2008).  
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II. REDD DESIGN IMPLICATIONS FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 
 
The Cancun Agreements are but the first step of a long process that will serve to 
define the details of REDD. In the meanwhile, demonstration activities are already 
underway,66 and numerous multilateral and bilateral processes have been established 
with the aim to support ‘REDD readiness,’67 most notably the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-
REDD Programme).  
The FCPF was launched in 2007 to assist tropical and subtropical forest 
countries develop systems and policies for REDD and eventually provide them with 
performance-based payments for emission reductions.68 In particular, the FCPF’s 
Readiness Fund assists countries in preparing for participation in a large-scale system 
of REDD incentives. So far, thirty-seven countries have adhered to the FCPF and the 
majority of them have already submitted so-called ‘REDD Readiness Preparation 
                                                
66 Decision 2/CP.13, supra note 11 at 3, encouraged parties to ‘explore a range of 
actions, identify options and undertake efforts, including demonstration 
activities, to address the drivers of deforestation relevant to their national 
circumstances, with a view to reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation and thus enhancing forest carbon stocks due to sustainable 
management of forests.’  
67 The term ‘REDD readiness’ is used to refer to a country’s capacity to carry out 
REDD activities and handle REDD financing effectively and equitably. For an 
overview on REDD readiness activities, see 
<http://reddplusdatabase.org/arrangement/list>. Compare also the website of 
the UN-REDD Programme, <http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/NationalProgrammes/tabid/584/Default.
aspx>; and that of the Forest Carbon Partnership, 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/203>. Other major 
international endeavours to promote REDD readiness include the Interim 
REDD+ Partnership, <http://reddpluspartnership.org/en/>. The most notorious 
bilateral activities undertaken to date are the ones between Norway and Brazil, 
Indonesia, Guyana, and Mexico, respectively. See 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/>. For a review, see NORAD, Real-Time 
Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative 
Contributions to a Global REDD+ Regime 2007-2010 (2011). 
68 See Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/>. 
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Proposals.’69 The FCPF also includes a Carbon Fund intended to pilot generation and 
payment for emission reductions for REDD countries, which is expected to become 
operational in 2011. The World Bank provides secretariat services for the FCPF, acts 
as a trustee for its funds, and supplies technical support to REDD country 
participants.70  
The UN-REDD Programme was established in 2008 by the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development 
Programme, and the United Nations Environment Programme.71 The program 
supports the development and implementation of national REDD strategies in 
developing countries, encompassing activities such as capacity development for 
governance structures, stakeholder engagement, monitoring systems, and activities to 
address multiple benefits, as well as payment and benefit structures for REDD. So far 
the UN-REDD Programme has approved funding for thirteen pilot countries, whereas 
another twenty-two countries enjoy partner status, which entails their potential to 
become eligible for funding in future.72  
In spite of these progresses, numerous outstanding technical and 
methodological matters remain to be addressed. In particular, three key challenges 
face the integration of biodiversity conservation in the REDD mechanism. The first 
issue is the elaboration of definitions of forest and REDD activities that do not create 
perverse incentives to biodiversity loss. The second is the elaboration of adequate 
monitoring tools to verify the impact of REDD activities on forest biodiversity as well 
as on carbon storage. The third is the identification of financing tools to secure 
funding for pursuing biodiversity co-benefits. This section summarizes the design 
questions that are most likely to influence REDD’s potential to contribute to 
biodiversity conservation. 
                                                
69 See <http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/25>. 
70 For a review of the FCPF activities, see FCPF, Harvesting Knowledge on REDD-
plus: Early Lessons from the FCPF Initiative and Beyond (2010). 
71 See UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, <http://www.un-redd.org/>. 
[UN-REDD Programme]. 
72 See UN-REDD Programme, <http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/NationalProgrammes/tabid/584/Default.
aspx>. For a review of the UN-REDD Programme activities, see UN-REDD, 
2010 Year in Review (2010). 
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1. Definitional Issues  
 
As mentioned earlier, REDD may result in the establishment of an international 
system for the payment of ecosystem services provided by forests in developing 
countries, capturing them through priced rewards.73 In this connection, the selection 
of activities to incentivize is critical. Although parties have agreed on the activities to 
include under the umbrella of REDD,74 they are yet to adopt definitions for them. The 
definition of these activities and of the notion of forest are likely to have significant 




The scope of REDD activities chiefly depends on the definition of the term ‘forest.’75 
According to the definition of forest adopted for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol, a 
forest is ‘an area of more than 0.05–1.0 hectares with a minimum “tree” crown cover 
of 10–30%, with “tree” defined as a plant with the capability of growing to be more 
than 2–5 metres tall.’76 This definition encompasses major variations in forest types 
and conditions, ranging from dry, open forests with slow-growing, scattered trees and 
as little as 10 percent crown cover to dense, highly productive moist forests.77 Most 
importantly, the definition fails to distinguish between natural forests and plantations, 
despite considerable differences in species composition, ecology, biodiversity value, 
and safety in carbon storage.78  
The ambiguities underlying the definition of forest under the Kyoto Protocol 
have led to concerns over the ecological integrity of afforestation and reforestation 
                                                
73 See note 51 in this article and corresponding text. 
74 See note 48 in this article and corresponding text.  
75 See FAO, Definitional Issues Related to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in 
Developing Countries: Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
in Developing Countries, Rome, 30 August and 1 September 2006 (2006). 
76 Decision 16/CMP.1 on Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/8/Add.3 (2005), Annex at 1A.  
77 For a discussion on the implications of this definition in the framework of the 
Kyoto Protocol, see T. Neeff, H. von Luepke, and D. Schoene, Choosing a 
Forest Definition for the Clean Development Mechanism, FAO Forests and 
Climate Change Working Paper 4 (2006). 
78 Harvey, Dickson, and Kormos, supra note 12 at 55. 
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projects under the CDM.79 Although the implementation of afforestation and 
reforestation projects was generally meant to ‘contribute’ to the conservation of 
biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources,80 this requirement was not 
strictly enforced. The CDM rules for afforestation and reforestation projects81 do not 
include specific safeguards for biodiversity, and some registered projects have raised 
concerns over their impact on biodiversity.82  
If the REDD mechanism adopts the definition of forest under the Kyoto 
Protocol, a wide range of forest contexts may fall within its scope, with great 
differences in carbon stocks, carbon sequestration potential, biodiversity value, and 
resilience to climate change: first, ‘primary forests’, which are more carbon dense and 
biologically diverse than other forest ecosystems;83 second, ‘modified natural forests,’ 
that is, forests that have been logged or degraded and normally have lower carbon 
stocks and less biodiversity than primary forests; and, third, ‘planted forests,’ which 
may be defined as ‘forest predominantly composed of trees established through 
planting and/ or deliberate seeding.’ Planted forests may consist of monocultures of 
non-native species, with low biodiversity value and low resilience to climate 
change.84  
The implications of including these different forest landscapes in REDD are 
likely to be significant and may result, for example, in channelling funds to non-
native tree species plantations, thus raising questions on the environmental and 
ecological integrity of REDD. Such concerns have prompted observers to call for the 
elaboration of adequate definitions of forest and forest activities,85 as further 
explained in the next section. 
                                                
79 See, inter alia, Pontecorvo, supra note 19; Jacquemont and Caparrós, supra note 
19; Sagemüller, supra note 19. 
80 Decision 16/CMP.1, supra note 76 at 1(e).  
81 Decision 5/CMP.1 on the Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities under the Clean Development Mechanism in 
the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006). For an analysis, see Jacquemont 
and Caparrós, supra note 19; van Asselt, Sindico, and Mehling, supra note 19. 
82 For a discussion, see Long, supra note 20 at 53. 
83 See note 27 in this article. 
84 FAO, supra note 1 at 212. 
85 See, among others, Harvey, Dickson, and Kormos, supra note 12; F. Pearce, Will 
REDD Preserve Forests or Merely Provide a Fig Leaf? Yale Environment 
360, <http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2277>; F.E. Putz and K.H. 
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B. REDD Activities 
 
A wide range of activities fall within the enlarged scope of REDD. To begin with, 
emissions reductions could be achieved by ‘reducing emissions from deforestation.’86 
The term has not yet been defined for the purposes of REDD, but under the Kyoto 
Protocol ‘deforestation’ means ‘direct human-induced conversion of forested land to 
non-forested land.’87 As mentioned earlier, the clear-cutting of mature trees associated 
with forest conversion to crops and livestock is currently the largest source of carbon 
emissions from the forest sector.88 Avoided deforestation is therefore likely to remain 
the main focus of REDD.  
Second, REDD activities may reduce emissions from ‘forest degradation.’89 
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has suggested defining forest 
degradation as ‘direct human-induced long-term loss (persisting for X years or more) 
of at least Y per cent of forest carbon stocks (and forest values) since time (T) and not 
qualifying as deforestation.’90 Although the definition remains problematic, the 
underlying idea is that degradation relates to forests’ carbon intensity rather than their 
size.91 The causes of deforestation and forest degradation also tend to be different: 
while deforestation is primarily driven by the demand for land, degradation is driven 
by the demand for wood.92 
Third, REDD may be realized through the ‘sustainable management of 
forests,’93 combining sustained wood yields with carbon storage—for example, 
                                                                                                                                      
Redford, Dangers of Carbon Based Conservation 19 Global Environmental 
Change 400 (2009); F.E. Putz and K.H. Redford, The Importance of Defining 
‘Forest’: Tropical Forest Degradation, Deforestation, Long-Term Phase 
Shifts and Further Transitions 42 Biotropica 10 (2010); Pistorius et al., supra 
note 12. 
86 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70(a). 
87 Decision 16/CMP.1, supra note 76, Annex at 1(d).  
88 See Nabuurs et al., supra note 46 at 543. 
89 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70(b). 
90 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Definitions and Methodological 
Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-Induced Degradation of 
Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types, at 16 (2003). 
91 See FAO, supra note 1 at 13. 
92 Zarin et al., supra note 17 at 13.  
93 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70(d). 
Forthcoming, 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011) 
 19 
through reduced impact logging.94 This concept recalls that of ‘sustainable forest 
management,’ which has proven controversial in negotiations on an international 
instrument on forests.95 While the notion of sustainable forest management has been 
endorsed and promoted largely by developed countries, numerous low-income 
countries perceive it as a hindrance to economic development and to the free 
exploitation of natural resources.96 Although it is not clear whether the parties will 
choose to use the term ‘sustainable management of forests’ as a synonym of 
‘sustainable forest management,’ they are likely to be confronted with challenges 
analogous to those that have affected prior efforts to define the term.97  
 Fourth, REDD encompasses ‘the conservation of forest carbon stocks.’98 Also 
this term currently lacks a definition. A critical question in this regard is whether the 
term will include existing protected areas, thus providing additional funding for the 
conservation of forests that are already under protected status.99  
Finally, REDD activities include the ‘enhancement of forest carbon stocks.’100 
Here again, the parties have yet to agree on a definition. Carbon stocks enhancement 
activities may include forest restoration (through natural regeneration, assisted natural 
regeneration, or planting), rehabilitation, or forest landscape restoration.101 Most 
crucially, they may include forest restoration of lands already classified as forests 
(‘reforestation’) and forestation of non-forest land (‘afforestation’).102 However, as 
these activities are already included under the CDM, double counting would have to 
be avoided. As mentioned earlier, the UNFCCC parties have yet to agree upon the 
                                                
94 Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 26. 
95 See note 3 in this article. 
96 See Davenport, Forests and Sustainability in  Rayner, Buck, and Katila, supra note 
4 at 87. 
97 See Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 26. 
98 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70(c). 
99 Harvey, Dickson, and Kormos, supra note 12 at 54. 
100 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 70(e). 
101 Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 29. 
102 Under the Kyoto Protocol, afforestation is defined as ‘the direct human-induced 
conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years 
to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced 
promotion of natural seed sources.’ The related notion of reforestation refers 
to ‘the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land 
through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources, on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested 
land.’ See Decision 16/CMP.1, supra note 76 at 1(b) and (c). 
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definition of these activities in connection with REDD. These questions have however 
already been considered in the framework of the CBD, where some concerns have 
been expressed. 
 
C. Forests and the CBD 
 
The CBD is the main international instrument for the protection of biodiversity,103 and 
it enjoys near universal membership.104 The convention recognizes biodiversity loss 
as a global environmental problem and promotes the conservation of biodiversity as a 
common concern of humankind.105 The CBD applies to all processes and activities 
that have, or are likely to have, significant impacts on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity undertaken within parties’ jurisdiction or 
control, also beyond the limits of their national jurisdictions.106 The convention 
further requires parties to identify and monitor these processes and activities and to 
regulate the ones whose significant impacts have been ascertained.107  
 Habitat loss, alteration, and fragmentation associated with deforestation and 
forest degradation are leading causes of species declines.108 Several provisions in the 
CBD are therefore directly and indirectly relevant to forests and forest management, 
even though the text of the convention does not make any explicit reference to 
forests.109 The CBD parties have adopted an Expanded Programme of Work on Forest 
                                                
103 The convention defines biological diversity as ‘the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems, and the ecological complexes of which they are part; it 
includes diversity within species between species, and of ecosystems.’ CBD, 
supra note 6, Article 2. 
104 As of 11 March 2011, 193 countries (including the European Union) have ratified 
the CBD, with the United States being a non-party. See CBD, List of Parties, 
<http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/>. 
105 CBD, supra note 6, preamble, para. 3. 
106 Ibid., Article 4. 
107 Ibid., Article 7(c). Parties are also required, as far as possible and as appropriate, to 
introduce national procedures requiring environmental impact assessments for 
activities that may cause significant adverse impacts with a view to avoiding 
or minimizing those impacts. Ibid., Article 14(1)(a). 
108 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: 
Biodiversity Synthesis, at 31 (2005).  
109 For an analysis of the role of the CBD in connection with forest governance, see 
D. Humphreys, Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, at 
191-204 (2006). 
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Biodiversity,110 which includes an extensive set of goals, objectives and activities for 
the conservation of forest biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of their genetic 
resources. The ‘ecosystem approach’ adopted by the CBD as its primary framework 
for action is also apt to condition parties’ activities in the forest sector.111 However, 
states retain significant discretion in implementing the ecosystem approach and the 
CBD programs of work. 
Links between biodiversity protection and climate change mitigation have 
been increasingly underscored in the framework of the CBD. In 2008, the CBD COP 
officially sanctioned climate change as a crosscutting issue within the convention and 
requested that climate change considerations be integrated into each CBD program of 
work, where relevant and appropriate.112 The CBD parties have also established an 
Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change, first to 
consider the inter-linkages between biological diversity and climate change113 and, 
later on, to develop scientific and technical advice on biodiversity in so far as it 
relates to climate change.114 The group’s findings give an overview of the impacts on 
biodiversity from activities included within the scope of REDD (see Table 1).115  
 
                                                
110 Decision VI/22 on Forest Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 
(2002). The CBD COP has established seven thematic programs of work that 
correspond to some of the major biomes on the planet. Programs of work are 
the main instruments to achieve commitments enshrined in the Convention 
and include guidelines for national implementation and tasks for furthering 
implementation at the international level. Each program includes a vision, 
basic principles, potential outputs, and timetables to guide future work. See 
<http://www.cbd.int/programmes/>.  
111 The ecosystem approach has been defined as the integrated management of land, 
water, and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in 
an equitable way. See Decision V/6 on Ecosystem Approach, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000). 
112 Decision IX/16 on Biodiversity and Climate Change, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16 (2008). 
113 CBD Secretariat, Interlinkages between Biological Diversity and Climate Change: 
Advice on the Integration of Biodiversity Considerations into the 
Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and Its Kyoto protocol (CBD Technical Series, 2003). 
114 Decision IX/5 on Forest Biodiversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/5 
(2008), preamble. 
115 CBD Secretariat, supra note 64. 
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Source: Pistorius et al. (2010) 
As shown in the table, REDD activities that focus on slowing the destruction or 
degradation of old growth or mature forests appear to do no harm to biodiversity and 
may even lead to substantial ecological co-benefits.116 A potentially negative effect 
could occur in fire-adapted ecosystems, such as tropical woodlands and savannahs, 
where fire suppression and biomass accumulation could lead to the local 
disappearance of plant and animal species that depend upon periodic burning.117 A 
more dangerous negative effect may be associated with a shift in agricultural and 
pasture expansion from high-biomass forests to low-biomass native ecosystems.118  
However, it is activities included under the enlarged scope of REDD that pose 
the most significant challenges to biodiversity conservation. Afforestation activities, 
for example, may lead to the replacement of important natural ecosystems by 
monocultural tree plantations, such as palm oil or eucalyptus. In general, the 
ecological effects of tree plantations vary depending upon the type of ecosystem that 
                                                
116 See Stickler et al., supra note 57 at 2816. 
117 Ibid. at 2806. 
118 See L. Miles and V. Kapos, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Global Land-Use Implications 320 
Science 1454 (2008). 
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the plantation is replacing.119 Tree plantations established in degraded landscapes 
might attract seed dispersal agents, catalyzing the regeneration of plant and animal 
communities.120 Still, plantations are intended to be cleared, and, from a biodiversity 
point of view, they do not represent a permanent habitat. REDD should therefore 
require a balanced appraisal of tree plantations to discern their benefits and ecological 
costs.121  
More generally, REDD should distinguish between ‘primary or natural 
forests,’ ‘modified-natural forests,’ and ‘planted forests.’122 This diversification would 
allow payments to be restricted to the conservation of forest carbon stocks only in 
primary forests. Such a restriction would, in turn, ease biodiversity concerns over the 
sustainable management of forests, which could be applied only to modified-natural 
forests and planted forests.123 As a result of this arrangement, in forest landscapes 
subject to ongoing clearing and forest degradation, climate change mitigation and 
biodiversity conservation could be achieved by reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation and improving forest management. In forest landscapes that currently 
experience little deforestation or forest degradation, the conservation of existing 
primary forests would allow to simultaneously protect carbon stocks and conserve 
biodiversity. Finally, in forest landscapes that have already been largely cleared and 
degraded, climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation could be achieved 
by enhancing carbon stocks through restoration and improved forest management. 
Parties have yet to take into consideration suggestions such as these, and 
developments in negotiations will show how concerns regarding REDD’s impact on 





                                                
119 CBD Secretariat, supra note 64 at 57. See also J. Barlow et al., Quantifying the 
Biodiversity Value of Tropical Primary, Secondary, and Plantation Forests 14 
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sc. U.S.A. 18555 (2007). 
120 J.A. Parrotta, J.W. Turnbull, and N. Jones, Catalyzing Native Forest Regeneration 
on Degraded Tropical Lands 99 Forest Ecol. & Mgmt 1 (1997). 
121 Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 29-30. 
122.Pistorius et al., supra note 12 at 21. 
123 Harvey, Dickson and Kormos, supra note 12 at 55. 
124 See the third section of this article. 
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2. Monitoring REDD Co-Benefits  
 
REDD’s biodiversity co-benefits may be maximized if REDD activities are 
implemented in areas of high carbon and high biodiversity.125 By mapping where 
these two elements overlap, it may be possible to capture them simultaneously. This 
action requires the development of adequate tools to identify areas that feature both 
characteristics.126  
REDD will entail the monitoring of forest carbon stocks, regardless of the 
provision of biodiversity co-benefits. In this respect, the Cancun Agreements 
mandated the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to 
prepare modalities for measuring, reporting, and verifying anthropogenic forest-
related emissions by sources as well as removals by sinks, forest carbon stocks and 
forest area changes resulting from the implementation of REDD activities.127 The 
main terms of reference for the development of such modalities are the IPCC 
guidelines for accounting changes in carbon stocks from land uses, land use changes, 
and forestry128 as well as methods and procedures developed outside the UNFCCC 
processes.129  
To a certain extent, the monitoring of REDD co-benefits for biodiversity can 
build upon existing data, such as the information collected for the preparation of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Forest Resource Assessments on forest 
cover, quality, and types, as well as the data in the national reports prepared under the 
                                                
125 V. Kapos and C.A. Ravilious, Carbon and Biodiversity: A Demonstration Atlas 
(2008); and B.B. Strassburg et al., Global Congruence of Carbon Storage and 
Biodiversity in Terrestrial Ecosystems 3 Conservation Letters 98 (2010). 
126 A partnership led by the UN Environment Programme World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (UNEP WCMC) has already developed maps overlaying 
information regarding carbon held in the vegetation and soils of terrestrial 
ecosystems with biodiversity data. See 
<http://uneptest.whiteoctober.co.uk/carbon-biodiversity-ecosystem-services-
interactive-maps_517.html >. 
127 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13, Appendix II, at (c). 
128 IPCC, Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(2003). 
129 See, in particular,  Global Observation for Forest and Land Cover Dynamics, A 
Sourcebook of Methods and Procedures for Monitoring, Measuring and 
Reporting Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals Caused 
by Deforestation, Gains and Losses of Carbon Stocks in Forests, Remaining 
Forests, and Forestation, COP-16 edition (2010).  
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CBD.130 The Cancun Agreements asked the SBSTA to develop guidance for 
providing information on how the safeguards are being ‘addressed and respected.’131 
This is clearly not a request for preparing standards to monitor, measure, and verify 
REDD’s biodiversity co-benefits. However, if the REDD mechanism is designed to 
include the provision of such co-benefits, a system to monitor, measure, and verify 
the impact of REDD activities on biodiversity may be needed.132  
So far, standards for measuring REDD’s impact on biodiversity have only 
been developed in the context of certification for the voluntary carbon market.133 
These standards serve to certify projects for investors driven by a desire to promote 
environmental and social goals that are additional to carbon sequestration. The 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and CARE have also 
facilitated the preparation of the ‘REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards,’ 
which are for use by national governments.134 
 The standards consist of principles, criteria, and indicators that define the 
issues of concern and the required levels of social and environmental performance. In 
particular, principle 5 requires that REDD activities maintain and enhance 
biodiversity and ecosystem services.135 The principle also requests that biodiversity 
and ecosystem services potentially affected by REDD be identified, prioritized, and 
mapped,136 and it prescribes the adoption of measures to maintain and enhance the 
identified biodiversity and ecosystem service priorities potentially affected.137 Finally, 
principle 5 requires that REDD activities do not lead to the conversion of natural 
                                                
130 CBD Secretariat, supra note 64 at 58. 
131 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13, Appendix II, at (b). 
132 Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 39. 
133 See, for example, Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Project Design Standards, 2nd edition 
(2008). 
134 CCBA and ClimateCARE, REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (2010). 
<http://www.climate-standards.org/REDD+/>. For a discussion, see Long, 
supra note 20 at 66. 
135 CCBA and ClimateCARE, supra note 134 at 5.1. According to the standards, 
‘principles’ are fundamental statements about the desired outcome and are not 
designed to be verified. Such principles are meant to be further developed 
through criteria, which may be therefore regarded as the substance of the 
standard, setting out the conditions that need to be met in order to deliver a 
principle.  
136 Ibid. at 5.1.1-2. 
137 Ibid. at 5.1.3. 
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forests or other areas that are important for maintaining and enhancing the identified 
biodiversity and ecosystem service priorities.138  
Although the standards are the result of a voluntary initiative, they are 
important terms of reference for the development of a monitoring, reporting, and 
verification system for the biodiversity co-benefits of REDD.139 Standards to monitor 
REDD co-benefits may be eventually formalized in a set of internationally generated 
and coordinated methodologies, similar to the IPCC guidelines.140 The use of these 
methodologies could become a condition for eligibility to access funding under 
existing international initiatives facilitating REDD141 and bilateral agreements 
stipulated to the same effect. Another way to achieve this objective may be by making 
use of certification.142 Agricultural commodity roundtables in Latin America, for 
example, have reportedly started to prohibit the certification of farmers who clear 
forests or savannahs to plant their crops or do not comply with labour and 
environmental laws and restrictions on the use of dangerous chemicals.143 
 
3. Financing REDD Co-Benefits 
 
The main options to generate REDD financing may have different implications for 
biodiversity co-benefits.144 First, REDD may be financed via the regulated carbon 
market. Such an approach would arguably present the advantage of engaging the 
private sector, thereby mobilizing high levels of financing. A second approach may be 
to finance REDD via voluntary state contributions or revenues from other fees, fines, 
and taxes. Whereas carbon market financing would be tied to delivering emission 
                                                
138 Ibid. at 5.1.4. 
139 The importance of the standards has been confirmed by the UN-REDD 
Programme, which explicitly mentioned them as a term of reference for the 
development of its ‘Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria.’ See the 
third section of this article, and note 191. 
140 Stickler et al., supra note 57 at 2811. 
141 See the section third of this article. 
142 Long, for example, suggests that REDD should integrate private and public 
initiatives, building upon expertise accrued through certification. See Long, 
supra note 20 at 66-68. 
143 D. Nepstad, Recognizing and Managing the Tropical Agricultural Revolution in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, at 7 (2011). 
144 For a comprehensive review of options, see Zarin et al., supra note 17.  
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reductions, the fund-based approach could also be used to support REDD readiness 
endeavours and capacity-building needs in developing countries.145 
A ‘phased approach’ to financing REDD is however likely to prevail, with a 
gradual transition from public funding for capacity building and demonstration 
activities, to market funding based on the trade in forest carbon certificates.146 This 
approach has the advantage of combing funding for REDD readiness arrangements 
while eventually broadening the funding base through the carbon market.147 The 
Cancun Agreements have endorsed a ‘phased approach’ to REDD but have remained 
silent on financing, which remains one of the most contentious issues for 
negotiation.148  
Reducing biodiversity loss and carbon emissions requires significant efforts 
from forest-rich developing countries, many of which cannot afford the investments 
required. In this regard, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
endorsed both by the CBD149 and the UNFCCC,150 calls upon developed countries to 
supply the means for undertaking biodiversity conservation and climate change 
mitigation endeavours in developing country parties. Nonetheless, inadequate 
allocation of financial resources under both instruments has so far greatly hindered 
the achievement of these objectives.  
REDD is particularly well positioned to streamline action under the two 
conventions. The main implications of REDD financing for biodiversity relate to its 
                                                
145 Ibid. at 7. 
146 Ibid. at 3.  
147 Ibid.  
148 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13 at 73. 
149 See CBD, supra note 6, Article 20.4: ‘The extent to which developing country 
Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention 
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of 
their commitments under this Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account the fact that economic 
and social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.’  
150 See UNFCCC, supra note 6, Article 4.7: ‘The extent to which developing country 
Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention 
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of 
their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and 
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.’ 
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potential for providing payments for ecosystem services for which no funding of 
similar scale exists.151 REDD may in fact generate a flow of revenue that is far greater 
than existing international conservation funding. Forests conserved in this way could 
dwarf the area of forested land currently under protected status.152 REDD could thus 
have the effect of conserving and restoring forests, while benefiting those who depend 
on them.153 In this connection, REDD provides a unique opportunity to streamline 
international law commitments on climate change mitigation, biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable development in the forest sector.  
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between REDD and protected areas 
remains undetermined.154 Investments in protected areas and improvements to their 
management are already included in some pilot programs for REDD.155 In instances 
such as these, it is critical to avoid the creation of perverse incentives for countries to 
discard protected areas, or withdraw funding from them, in anticipation of REDD 
payments.156  
The provision of biodiversity co-benefits is likely to entail additional costs, 
such as those associated with the monitoring of the implementation of safeguards.157 
Purchasers of REDD carbon credits may be willing to pay a premium to save 
imperilled ecosystems or species and REDD co-benefits could become the object of 
special premiums.158 Standards that reflect biodiversity co-benefits may therefore be 
used to differentiate forest carbon in the marketplace, in association with premiums 
for forest carbon credits that also generate biodiversity co-benefits.159 However, 
voluntary schemes are unlikely to supply the scale of funding necessary to create 
biodiversity premiums globally. Just as demand for CDM credits is driven by legally 
binding emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, demand for 
                                                
151 Harvey, Dickson, and Kormos, supra note 12 at 1. 
152 Ibid. at 2. 
153 Stickler et al., supra note 57 at 2804. 
154 K. Karousakis, Promoting Biodiversity Co-Benefits in REDD, at 17 and 20 
(Environment Working Papers, 2009). See also the second section of this 
article. 
155 Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 25. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. at 39. 
158 TEEB, supra note 55 at 15. 
159 Ibid. 
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biodiversity premiums may need to be stimulated by specific requirements included in 
the detailed rules that will eventually be adopted to operationalize REDD.160 
 
4. REDD and Biodiversity: Caveats and Opportunities 
 
This section has summarized the questions concerning REDD’s impact on 
biodiversity, highlighting the potential not only for synergies but also for perverse 
outcomes. The inclusion of biodiversity concerns in REDD is likely to require 
additional monitoring and verification as well as funding. The extent to which the 
UNFCCC parties may be willing to pursue synergies between biodiversity 
conservation and climate change mitigation is still unclear. In the meanwhile, work 
carried out under the auspices of the CBD Secretariat has raised awareness of the 
need to address overlapping obligations under the two conventions. In this context, 
the debate on ‘biodiversity safeguards’ provides an insight on how REDD may 
enhance concerted action to simultaneously achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC 
and the CBD in developing countries, as the next section explains.  
 
III. THE DEBATE ON BIODIVERSITY SAFEGUARDS FOR REDD 
 
The CBD and the UNFCCC view forests from different perspectives. While the CBD 
is concerned with forests as habitats and as components of biodiversity, under the 
UNFCCC they are chiefly carbon sinks and sources. Despite these different 
approaches, both conventions address forest management to a certain degree and, 
when implementing REDD activities, parties to both conventions are likely to be 
faced with overlapping obligations.161 As mentioned earlier, this issue has already 
arisen in connection with afforestation and reforestation projects under the CDM, and 
some scholars have pointed to potential synergies and frictions.162 
The CBD and the UNFCCC are equally binding upon parties and the principle 
pacta sunt servanda requires parties to fulfil their commitments under both treaties in 
                                                
160 See Karousakis, supra note 154 at 20. 
161 In this connection, it is important to recall that both treaties have virtually 
universal membership. See note 6 in this article. 
162 See note 79 in this article and corresponding text. 
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good faith.163 Arguably, the CBD and the UNFCCC may be regarded as ‘common 
interest treaties,’ as they were negotiated in parallel and adopted at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.164 Both conventions deal with 
global environmental problems and establish regimes of almost universal application, 
which prohibit parties from making specific reservations to their provisions.165 The 
objectives of the conventions are not mutually exclusive, and they provide several 
areas for mutually supportive action. In this respect, overlapping obligations should 
be viewed as an integrated whole, and parties to both the CBD and the UNFCCC 
should adopt a harmonizing approach to the respective obligations.166  
The same seems to apply to decisions by treaty bodies. It exceeds the scope of 
the present article to enquire on the legal nature of these processes. Treaty-based 
institutions, such as COPs, may be regarded as mere diplomatic conferences or 
‘coalitions of the willing.’167 As such, it is open to debate whether their decisions 
have enough legal strength to amount to international obligations.168 Nevertheless, it 
is beyond dispute that COP decisions ‘can influence the substantive obligations of the 
parties in numerous ways, affect the internal workings of the treaty regime and its 
institutions, and serve efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the treaty.’169 The 
                                                
163 Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, Article 26. 
164 See Pontecorvo, supra note 19 at 742; Jacquemont and Caparrós, supra note 19 at 
178. The existence of common interests is, inter alia, confirmed by the 
establishment of a Joint Liaison Group between the Rio conventions, as an 
informal forum for exchanging information, exploring opportunities for 
synergistic activities, and increasing co-ordination. See the discussion in the 
third section of this article and in note 221. 
165 CBD, supra note 6, Article 34; UNFCCC, supra note 6, Article 24.  
166 Compare International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, at 414 
(2006).  
167 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, at 
11 (2009). 
168 For an analysis, see R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional 
Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed 
Phenomenon in International Law 94 A.J.I.L. 623 (2000); J. Brunnée, COPing 
with Consent: Lawmaking under Multilateral Environmental Agreements 15 
Leiden J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); A. Wiersema, The New International Law-Makers? 
Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements 31 
Michigan J. Int’l L. 231 (2009).  
169 See Wiersema, supra note 168 at 245. Compare Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, 
supra note 167 at 19. 
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complex legal framework established under the UNFCCC, for one, has been crucially 
defined by COP decisions.170 Also here, overlaps with other international processes 
may be better addressed through a harmonizing approach. In this connection, parties 
to both the UNFCCC and the CBD are faced with some ‘potential for synergy.’171 As 
the next section shows, the treaty bodies have already taken some action to address 
this potential. 
 
1. Biodiversity Safeguards under the UNFCCC 
 
The term ‘safeguards’ first appeared in negotiations in 2009 to indicate, inter alia, 
measures to protect biological diversity, ‘including safeguards against conversion of 
natural forests to forest plantations.’172 Ever since, the debate on safeguards has 
centred on their scope and means of implementation. Some authors have argued that 
countries benefiting from REDD should be prohibited from clearing native vegetation 
or terrestrial ecosystems of high biodiversity-value for the establishment of plantation 
forests.173 Along similar lines, it has been suggested that sustainable forest 
management activities must not affect primary forests of high biodiversity value.174 In 
this respect, parties may be required to report forest biodiversity data, together with 
data concerning carbon stocks.175 Countries intending to participate in REDD may 
                                                
170 COP decisions have been deployed to take fundamental steps for defining crucial 
details of obligations under the convention and the Kyoto Protocol, such as, 
for example, the so-called Marrakesh Accords. UNFCCC, Addendum: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Seventh Session, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/13/Add.1 (2001), FCCC/CP/13/Add.2 (2001), and 
FCCC/CP/13/Add.3 (2001). 
171 van Asselt, supra note 20 at 4.  
172 Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
Non-Paper 11 on Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues 
Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable 
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in 
Developing Countries, Revised annex III C to UN Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/INF.2 (2009) at 4(f). 
173 Stickler et al., supra note 57 at 2806. 
174 Pistorius et al., supra note 12 at 7. 
175 Harvey, Dickson, and Kormos, supra note 12 at 55. 
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also be required to demonstrate that measures to protect areas of high biodiversity 
have been undertaken.176  
The Cancun Agreements partially address these concerns by mentioning that 
REDD activities ‘are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological 
diversity’ and ‘are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used 
to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem 
services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits.’177 The implications 
of this and other safeguards, however, presently depend on parties’ interpretation and 
enforcement of the inherent requirements. In this regard, the wording chosen to 
introduce the safeguards merely asserts, ‘the following safeguards should be 
promoted and supported.’178 This terminology clearly suggests that the safeguards are 
voluntary and not currently intended to be part of mandatory conditions for 
implementing REDD.  
Furthermore, the Cancun Agreements merely requests parties to develop ‘a 
system for providing information’ on how the safeguards are being addressed and 
respected throughout the implementation of the activities, ‘while respecting 
sovereignty.’179 The text arguably represents a relapse compared with earlier versions 
that requested parties to develop ‘a robust and transparent national forest monitoring 
system for the monitoring and reporting of the activities … and the safeguards.’180 
The fact that the latter expression now appears only in connection with ‘activities,’ 
together with the newly inserted reference to ‘sovereignty,’ seems to leave room to 
speculate that parties deliberately intended to attenuate this requirement with specific 
reference to safeguards. This weakened terminology is mirrored in the mandate to the 
SBSTA.181 The Cancun Agreements have mandated the SBSTA to develop 
‘modalities’ for national forest emission levels and national forest monitoring 
                                                
176 Stickler et al., supra note 57 at 2806. 
177 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13, Appendix I at 2(e). 
178 Ibid., Appendix I at 2. 
179 Ibid., at 71(d). 
180 Draft Decision -/CP.15 on Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues 
Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable 
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in 
Developing Countries, UN Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/L.7/Add.6 (2009) at 5(c). 
181 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 13, Appendix II. 
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systems, but only to develop ‘guidance’ for safeguards.182 Safeguards had been 
included under modalities in earlier editions of the text.183  
If the experience of the CDM offers an apt model for comparison, it may be 
years before the parties are in a position to adopt a fully fledged set of rules on 
REDD. Although domestic conditions and national and sub-national action are 
crucial, the need for internationally coordinated standards for biodiversity safeguards 
could not be greater. Concerted international action is necessary to establish a level 
playing field, ensuring the pursuit of co-benefits as well as compliance with extant 
international obligations. In this context, the processes that are presently most likely 
to guide and influence individual country action are those dealing with REDD 
readiness, most notably the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme.  
Both the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme require countries to consider 
ecosystem and social benefits in establishing their REDD national programs, although 
they do not make any mandatory requirements in this connection.184 The related 
standards are still in the process of being drafted. The FCPF Charter asserts that the 
operation of the facility must comply with the World Bank’s Operational Policies and 
Procedures, which are designed to avoid, mitigate, or minimize adverse 
environmental and social impacts of projects supported by the bank.185 Since the 
policies and procedures were mainly developed with project-based lending in mind,186 
the FCPF has adapted them to the REDD readiness planning process, chiefly through 
the use of ‘Strategic Environmental and Social Assessments.’187 The assessments are 
                                                
182 Ibid., Appendix II at (b). 
183 Draft Decision -/CP.15, supra note 180 at 9. 
184 See Miles, Dunning, and Doswald, supra note 12 at 7. 
185 World Bank, Charter Establishing the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2010), Article 3(d). 
See also <http://www.worldbank.org/safeguards>. 
186 N. Moss and R. Nussbaum, A Review of Three REDD+ Safeguard Initiatives, at 7 
(2011). 
187 The FCPF has produced guidelines to assist countries in incorporating 
environmental and social considerations in readiness activities financed by the 
Readiness Fund. See FCPF, Incorporating Environmental and Social 
Considerations into the Process of Getting Ready for REDD plus, revised draft 
(7 March 2010). The guidelines specify that during the readiness process, the 
scope of application of World Bank safeguard policies will depend on the 
nature of the activities for which a REDD country participant seeks support. 
Given that the precise nature of the readiness activities will not be known until 
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meant to identify and determine specific environmental and social impacts as well as 
the legal and policy implications of REDD activities,188 including consideration of 
relevant ‘international treaties and other instruments which the country must comply 
with or take into consideration.’189 The deviation from the World Bank’s Operational 
Policies and Procedures, and the perceived lack of stringent requirements have, 
however, attracted some criticism.190  
The other main international process engaged in REDD readiness, the UN-
REDD Programme, is in the course of developing specific ‘Social and Environmental 
Principles and Criteria,’191 which are expected to build upon the safeguards included 
in the UNFCCC texts and reflect UN policies set out in relevant conventions and 
treaties.192 In March 2011, the UN-REDD Programme published a draft set of 
principles and criteria, which encompass democratic governance; impacts on 
stakeholder livelihoods; policy coherence; the protection and conservation of natural 
forests; the maintenance and enhancement of a forest’s multiple functions; and the 
minimization of indirect adverse impacts on ecosystem services and biodiversity.193 
An interim report on the development of the principles is expected to be submitted to 
the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board in October 2011, and the framework will be 
finalized after COP-17. The final result will be the establishment of UN-REDD 
operational guidance for all future national programs.  
Although the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme have no formal links to 
the UNFCCC system, bilateral co-operation and experience that has so far accrued 
                                                                                                                                      
they are more fully elaborated, the safeguards determination may need to be 
refined at a later stage. Ibid. at 2.  
188 Ibid., Appendix 2. 
189 Ibid., Appendix 2 at 3(b). 
190 K. Dooley et al, Smoke and Mirrors: A Critical Assessment of the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (2011). Compare also the ample coverage provided by the 
REDD Monitor, <http://www.redd-monitor.org/tag/forest-carbon-partnership-
facility/> and by the Forest Peoples Programme, 
<http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/climate-forests>. 
191 UN-REDD, Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, version 1 (2011). 
192 UN-REDD, The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015, at 15 (2011). The 
strategy further asserts that risk assessment tools are expected to draw upon 
criteria from existing voluntary and minimum standard initiatives, such as the 
CCBA/Climate Care REDD Social and Environmental Standards. CCBA and 
Climate CARE, supra note 139. For a discussion, see Long, supra note 20 at 
66. 
193 UN-REDD, supra note 191. 
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through these processes provides particularly important evidence to assess the 
feasibility of forest governance reforms through REDD as well as the potential to use 
conditionality to achieve climate change mitigation in developing countries. There are 
overlaps between countries adhering to the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme, and 
concerns regarding the duplication of efforts have been raised.194 The two-track 
approach has also been the object of criticism for facilitating finance flows to richer 
and better-equipped forest countries, while entrenching and expanding the division 
that already exists between those with and without the ability to implement REDD.195  
Nevertheless, before a comprehensive set of rules on REDD under the 
UNFCCC is adopted, the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme remain the main 
source of guidance for countries seeking to get ready for REDD. So far, these 
processes have failed to undertake convincing action to shape ‘biodiversity 
safeguards’ for REDD. It is therefore critical to draw upon guidance provided by 
other international processes dealing with forests. One of the most important terms of 
reference in this connection is guidance elaborated in the framework of the CBD.196  
 
2. Biodiversity Safeguards under the CBD 
 
Already in 2008, the CBD COP issued a decision calling on parties, non-party 
governments, and international organizations to ensure that REDD support the aims 
and implementation of the CBD, provide benefits for forest biodiversity, and involve 
biodiversity experts in REDD program design.197 In 2010, the CBD COP took further 
steps in this direction by adopting Decision X.33, which provides ‘guidance on ways 
to conserve, sustainably use and restore biodiversity and ecosystem services while 
contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation.’198 The decision includes a 
wide range of recommendations on REDD and its impact on biodiversity.199  
                                                
194 For an overview, see NORAD, supra note 67 at 56. 
195 IDEAcarbon, Assessing the Financial Flows for REDD+: the Pledge-
Implementation Gap (2011) at 4. 
196 Pistorius et al., supra note 12. 
197 Decision IX/5, supra note 114 at 2a. 
198 Decision X/33 on Biodiversity and Climate Change, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at 8. 
199 For a comprehensive review of the decisions adopted at CBD COP-10, see E. 
Morgera, Faraway, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions 
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The decision encourages parties to promote the importance of biodiversity 
considerations in ongoing discussions on REDD,200 inviting them to implement 
ecosystem-based approaches for climate change adaptation and mitigation201 and to 
reduce the biodiversity impacts of climate change adaptation and mitigation 
measures.202 In connection with mitigation, parties are called upon to implement 
ecosystem-management activities, including the protection of natural forests, natural 
grasslands, and peatlands, and the sustainable management of forests, with 
consideration of the use of native communities of forest species in reforestation 
activities.203  
These issues are addressed in other passages of the decision, where parties are 
invited to implement improved land management, reforestation, and forest restoration 
in forest landscapes, subject to harvesting, clearing, and/or degradation, prioritizing 
the use of ‘native communities of species,’ and limiting the degradation and clearing 
of primary and secondary (that is, modified natural) forests.204 Furthermore, when 
designing, implementing, and monitoring afforestation, reforestation, and forest 
restoration activities, parties are invited to consider the conservation of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services by, for example, converting only land of low biodiversity 
value or ecosystems largely composed of non-native species—preferably degraded 
ones; prioritizing, whenever feasible, local and acclimated native tree species when 
selecting species for planting; avoiding invasive alien species; preventing the net 
reduction of carbon stocks in all organic carbon pools; strategically locating 
afforestation activities within the landscape to enhance connectivity; and increasing 
the provision of ecosystem services within forest areas.205  
Most crucially, Decision X/33 invites parties to use strategic environmental 
assessments and environmental impact assessments to increase the positive impacts 
and to reduce the negative impacts of climate-change mitigation and adaptation 
                                                                                                                                      
between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law 2 
Climate Law 85 (2011).  
200 Decision X/33, supra note 198 at 3. 
201 Ibid. at 8(j-l) and (m-t). 
202 Ibid. at 8(u-x). 
203 Ibid. at (n). 
204 Ibid. at (o). 
205 Ibid. at (p). 
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measures on biodiversity.206 As is discussed earlier in this article, the deployment of 
similar tools is already required by extant initiatives to facilitate REDD readiness, 
which, for the time being, are the most important means in ascertaining baseline 
conditions for REDD.207 
Decision X/33’s detailed guidance is further strengthened through the 
provision of arrangements to enhance collaboration with the UNFCCC and other 
international bodies.208 In particular, the decision requests the CBD’s executive 
secretary to convene an expert workshop on REDD with a view to enhancing the 
coordination of capacity-building efforts related to biodiversity, ecosystem-based 
carbon sequestration, and the conservation of forest carbon stocks.209 The COP further 
requires the executive secretary to provide advice to other international bureaucracies 
dealing with REDD on a number of issues, including the application of relevant 
biodiversity safeguards, to ensure consistency with the objectives of the CBD, and to 
avoid negative impacts on, and enhance benefits for, biodiversity.210  
The executive secretary was asked to identify possible indicators to assess 
REDD’s contribution to achieving the objectives of the CBD and mechanisms to 
monitor the impact on biodiversity from these and other ecosystem-based approaches 
for climate change mitigation.211 Both requests came with the specification that such 
activities should not pre-empt ‘any future decisions taken under the [UNFCCC].’212 
This concern was reiterated with a mention of the respective independent legal status 
and mandates of the Rio conventions and the different composition of parties.213 
Finally, the decision required the executive secretary to convey a proposal to develop 
joint activities between the three Rio conventions, including biodiversity 
considerations related to REDD.214  
                                                
206 Ibid. at (u). 
207 See the discussion in the third section of this article. 
208 Decision X/33, supra note 198 at 9-10. 
209 Ibid. at 9(f). 
210 Ibid. at 9(g). 
211 Ibid. at 9(h). 
212 Ibid. at 9(g-h). 
213 Ibid. at 13. 
214 Ibid. at 13 and 10, respectively. The decision further invited the Rio conventions 
COPs to include the development of such joint activities in the agenda of the 
next meeting of the Joint Liaison Group. See ibid. at 13(b). See also note 221 
in this article. 
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The executive secretary has already undertaken some action to comply with 
these requests and invited parties to send their views, experiences, and expectations 
with regard to REDD safeguards, to identify possible indicators to assess the 
contribution of REDD to achieving the objectives of the CBD; and to submit their 
views on mechanisms to monitor the impacts from REDD and other ecosystem-based 
approaches for climate change mitigation measures on biodiversity.215 
Decision X/33 may be viewed as an attempt to ‘influence the design of 
REDD’ and to address overlaps between biodiversity protection and climate change 
mitigation in the forest sector.216 The CBD COP has evidently followed the debate on 
biodiversity safeguards for REDD and addressed them in much greater detail than its 
equivalent under the UNFCCC. Arguably, the CBD COP has also taken a more 
‘holistic’ and proactive stance on the matter,217 which is fitted with the all-
encompassing objective of the CBD and its previous efforts to promote enhanced 
concerted action under the Rio conventions.218 It remains to be seen how parties to the 
UNFCCC will respond to these initiatives. The next session should provide some 
illumination on this point. 
 
3. Biodiversity Safeguards for REDD: An Early Assessment 
 
Several questions may be raised regarding integration of the guidance supplied by the 
CBD COP within the UNFCCC process. While the CBD has been rather vocal in 
requesting enhanced concerted action under the conventions, these calls have so far 
remained largely unanswered by the UNFCCC COP, save for a few erratic 
exceptions.219 Since the texts of the conventions lack specific provisions on 
cooperation, the biodiversity safeguards included in the decisions of the treaty-making 
bodies should be interpreted and implemented in good faith by the parties to those 
                                                
215 CBD Secretariat, Submission of Views on Relevant Safeguards in Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of 
Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest 
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD+), Doc. 
SCBD/STTM/JM/TC/JSt/74726 (2011).  
216 van Asselt, supra note 20 at 39.  
217 Morgera, supra note 199 at 95. 
218 For an analysis, see ibid. at 91-92. 
219 See Decision 13/CP.8 on Cooperation with Other Conventions, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/7/Add.1 (2002), preamble. 
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instruments. One major obstacle affecting the integration within REDD of guidance 
supplied by the CBD COP may be that the parties have tended to interpret the 
conventions’ mandate restrictively.220 The Joint Liaison Group221 established to 
enhance coordination between the Rio conventions  and to explore options for further 
cooperation has delivered few results to date,222 perhaps confirming the parties’ 
limited political will to strengthen concerted action.223 
The very fact that the CBD COP guidance has not percolated through the text 
of the Cancun Agreements may be read as a signal of this continued restraint. Such 
apparent restraint, however, may also simply reflect the fact that the CBD COP took 
place only a few weeks before the UNFCCC COP, thus leaving little time for the one 
process to feed into the other.  The text of the Cancun Agreements provides scope for 
limited optimism, as it asserts ‘the need to strengthen international cooperation and 
expertise to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and 
                                                
220 See van Asselt, supra note 20 at 41, where the author quotes as an example the fact 
that Australia has expressed the view that the CBD and the Convention to 
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 33 I.L.M. 1273 (1994), do not have a 
legitimate role in climate change mitigation. Compare SBSTA, Views on the 
Paper on Options for Enhanced Cooperation among the Three Rio 
Conventions, Submissions from Parties, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/MISC.4 16 
(2006), submission by Australia, at 5. 
221 The Joint Liaison Group was established to enhance co-ordination between the 
three conventions, including the exchange of relevant information, and to 
explore options for further co-operation between the conventions, including 
the possibility of a joint work plan and/or a workshop. See SBSTA, Report of 
the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice on the Second 
Part of Its Fourteenth Session, Bonn, 24-27 July 2001, UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTA/2 (2001) at 42(d). The establishment of the group was later 
endorsed by Decision 13/CP.8, supra note 219. Since then, co-operation with 
the CBD has been discussed under the agenda item of ‘cooperation with 
relevant international organizations.’  
222 In this regard, Decision 13/CP.8, supra note 219, generally affirms the need for 
enhanced cooperation ‘with the aim of ensuring the environmental integrity of 
the [Rio conventions] and promoting synergies under the common objective of 
sustainable development, in order to avoid duplication of efforts, strengthen 
joint efforts and use available resources more efficiently.’  
223 For an overview on co-operative action, see SBSTA, Summary of Cooperative 
Activities with United Nations Entities and Intergovernmental Organizations 
to Contribute to the Work under the Convention, UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTA/INF.3 (2011). 
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slow onset events.’224 A footnote to the text includes biodiversity loss among the 
mentioned effects. Furthermore, Appendix I specifically mentions that REDD 
activities should ‘complement’ or be ‘consistent with the objectives of national forest 
programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements.’225   
It remains to be seen what the UNFCCC COP will decide in future 
negotiations. In this connection, the SBSTA has been given the mandate of putting 
flesh on the safeguards outlined in the Cancun Agreements. The work of the SBSTA 
may be a propitious opportunity to bridge the gap and streamline parties’ 
commitments in this area. However, the operationalization of safeguards (and of 
REDD) entirely depends on the progress in the negotiations on renewed commitments 
under the UNFCCC. At the time of writing, the process continues to be slow, and 
agreement at the next COP seems increasingly unlikely.226 Rebus sic stantibus, it 
remains up to individual countries to interpret their obligations under the CBD and the 
UNFCCC, as well as guidance by their treaty bodies, in an integrated fashion. In this 
context, the processes that are presently most likely to guide and influence individual 
country action are the FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme. Although the FCPF and 
the UN-REDD Programme have no formal links to the UNFCCC system, they remain 
for the time being the main reference for countries seeking to address the biodiversity 
concerns raised by REDD. Lessons learned through these processes are likely to 
shape the debate on safeguards and the work of the SBSTA on the issue, together with 
guidance provided in Decision X.33. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The last decade has witnessed unprecedented reforms in domestic forest laws and 
policies.227 It does not seem misguided to argue that REDD has played a significant 
part in driving this change. The extent to which REDD will deliver biodiversity co-
benefits depends on how and where activities are implemented. If REDD succeeds in 
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avoiding negative impacts on biodiversity, it may simultaneously advance forest 
conservation and climate change mitigation in developing countries.  
As a proposed mechanism under the UNFCCC, REDD is chiefly about 
climate change mitigation and will not be a panacea for biodiversity loss. Still, 
overlaps between carbon sequestration and biodiversity protection in the forest sector 
should be addressed in a way that is consistent with states’ extant international 
commitments. Parties to the CBD are surely expected to take into consideration the 
guidance provided by Decision X/33. And since parties to the CBD and the UNFCCC 
are virtually the same, it seems desirable to design REDD in a way that streamlines 
the guidance provided by CBD decisions and that reinforces the global commitment 
to biodiversity conservation. 
So far, negotiations on REDD seem to have taken opportunities for synergies 
into account only marginally. The very extent that biodiversity safeguards should be 
included in REDD is still the subject of debate. Some argue it is unwise to further 
complicate an already troubled negotiation process with requirements for biodiversity 
co-benefits, which may impede swift action to ensure climate change mitigation.228 
Perhaps, but the rewards of getting it right stretch beyond climate change mitigation 
and include the conservation of some of the world's richest terrestrial ecosystems. In 
this regard, REDD may present an unparalleled win-win opportunity to combine 
climate change mitigation with biodiversity conservation. 
As described throughout this article, successful implementation of REDD 
faces substantial challenges. Forests in developing countries lie at the interface of 
economic, environmental, and social policies. The questions that are being discussed 
in connection with the establishment of the REDD mechanism are not new and have 
hampered official development assistance and forest conservation efforts for decades. 
Any instrument designed to reform the status quo is going to face considerable and 
potentially even insurmountable challenges. As forest loss is driven by forces that 
may not be kept under control at the domestic level, an international framework to 
address the problem is quite necessary. REDD potentially lends itself to this purpose 
and could become the framework for elaborating a set of rules about acceptable forest 
uses, which also streamline commitments undertaken with the CBD. In this context, 
the additional momentum associated with the coincidence of climate change 
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mitigation and biodiversity conservation objectives may provide the leverage to 
finally overcome obstacles that have hindered international collaboration in the forest 
sector so far. 
